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ANTITRUST
ANTITRUST-PRICE FIXING-TERRITORIAL DIVISIONS
Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 497 F.2d 1178
(10th Cir. 1974)
By FRED C. BRIGMAN, JR.*
The only significant antitrust case decided by the Tenth Cir-
cuit during 1974 was Adolph Coors Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission.' Coors was an appeal by the Adolph Coors Company
from a cease and desist order of the Federal Trade Commission,
which had found Coors in violation, as a matter of law, of section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.' Section 5 broadly pro-
scribes "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive
acts or practices" in interstate commerce. As in Coors, the section
has often been interpreted to prohibit price fixing' and exclusive
dealing arrangements.' The court reluctantly followed the land-
mark holding of the Supreme Court in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,5 which was based on section 1 of the Sherman
Act,' but adds dictum in criticism of that opinion. The court in
Coors suggested but does not hold that the Schwinn rule, under
which territorial restrictions on resale are per se unlawful once a
manufacturer parts with title, "should yield to situations where
a unique product requires territorial restrictions to remain in
business."' In those latter situations, the court advises, the
Supreme Court should develop a rule-of-reason exception.
Coors is the fourth largest brewer in the United States.
Among the nation's 70 manufacturers of beer, Coors alone ships
all of its beer from one plant and employs a brewing process which
*Vice-president and General Counsel, Bionic Sciences Corporation, Boulder, Colo-
rado; A.B., 1943, Southwestern University; LL.B., 1949, The University of Texas.
1 497 F.2d 1178 (10th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 0000 (U.S. Jan.
13, 1975)(No. 74-128).
2 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970).
1 See, e.g., National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965);
Keasbey & Mattison Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1947); Eugene Dietzgen Co. v.
FTC, 142 F.2d 321 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944); Shakespeare Co. v. FTC,
50 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1931).
' See, e.g., FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC,
442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971); Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc. v. FTC 301 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.
1962).
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
497 F.2d at 1187.
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requires refrigerated marketing. Because of the delicacy of its
product, the court found, Coors necessarily must strictly monitor
refrigeration controls and expeditious marketing techniques after
each shipment of beer leaves its plant. Coors employs 35 area
representatives to help market its products. Area representatives
are responsible for working with 166 independent distributors and
one wholly-owned subsidiary distributor is assigned a territory
within which to market Coors beer.
At the time of the cease and desist order, it was Coors' policy
to encourage "pricing integrity," or a program of price mainte-
nance, in the wholesaling of its products by its distributors. Al-
though the Coors Policy Manual allowed Coors and its agents the
right to suggest minimum wholesale prices only and repudiated
the use of threats, coercion, or intimidation of wholesalers and
retailers, the Commission examined several present and former
Coors distributors who testified to the effect that Coors, its offi-
cials, and area representatives set the prices at which distributors
were to sell Coors beer. Since there are about 7000 applicants for
distributorships, the court found, any distributor not conforming
to the pricing policy could be replaced. Coors' contracts with its
distributors provided for termination by Coors on 5-days' notice
for cause and 30-days' notice without cause. The Commission
found that Coors had used the threat of speedy termination to
force the distributors into anticompetitive price fixing. The court
held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support
the Commission's finding of fact.8 Commission findings of en-
forced retail price fixing by Coors were similarly upheld by the
court.
Equally clear to the Tenth Circuit were Coors' efforts, in
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, to
exclude from competition other light draught beer manufacturers
by requiring in fact that tavern owners purchase Coors draught
beer exclusively. Coors admitted that under its distributor con-
tracts its distributors were restricted to vertically imposed territo-
ries which Coors could alter at will. The manufacturer argued,
however, that these territorial restrictions were reasonable and
legal. The Commission had found vertical territorial divisions to
be illegal per se. Based on Schwinn,9 the court upheld that deter-
, See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
' The Supreme Court there held that
Once the manufacturer has parted with title and risk, he has parted with
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mination' ° but not without some apparent dissatisfaction. Seem-
ingly convinced that Coors' unique manufacturing process might
justify reasonable territorial limitations in its distribution," the
court observed that
speed of delivery, quality control of the product, refrigerated deliv-
ery, and condition of the Coors product at the time of delivery may
justify restraints on trade that would be unreasonable when applied
to marketing standardized products. . . .Perhaps the Supreme
Court may see the wisdom of grafting an exception to the per se rule
when a product is unique and where the manufacturer can justify
its territorial restraints under the rule of reason.'
2
Because both price fixing'3 and vertical and horizontal territorial
divisions'4 have repeatedly been held illegal per se under section
1 of the Sherman Act or section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, it does not appear that Coors is the appropriate case to
appeal to the Supreme Court on the ground that a "rule of rea-
son" should be ingrafted on those holdings. The technological
problems inherent in distributing Coors' products over wider geo-
graphical areas do not appear so insurmountable as to warrant a
judicial analysis of the reasonableness of Coors' territorial divi-
sions.
The cease and desist order issued by the Federal Trade Com-
mission contained 13 operative paragraphs. The first 11 para-
graphs restrained Coors from fixing prices for distributors or re-
tailers, from enforcing any territorial restrictions, from restricting
competition between and among distributors and retailers, from
dominion over the product, and his effort thereafter to restrict territory or
persons to whom the product may be transferred-whether by explicit agree-
ment or by silent combination or understanding with his vendee-is a per
se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
,0 The court noted that less restrictive alternatives were available to Coors. If quality
control was Coors' objective in assigning territories, "Coors may still condition its sales
to distributors and others upon maintenance of procedures necessary to control the quality
of the product." 497 F.2d at 1187. Violation of such conditions would thus presumably
become the basis for a contract termination with cause.
The court noted:
Thus we are foreclosed from considering the reasonableness of the restriction
or its business justification. We are cognizant of the unpredictability which
is created in relationship to the Coors operation.
Id.
12 Id.
11 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150
(1940); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
", United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, (1967); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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interfering with distributors or retailers handling other beers, and
from cancelling or threatening to cancel any distributor's contract
or refusing to sell them beer because of past or future violations
of price or territorial restrictions. Paragraph "12" increased the
contract periods of notice of termination to 60 days in case of
termination for cause and to 180 days in case of termination
without cause. Paragraph "13" ordered Coors to provide for arbi-
tration in the city in which the distributor resided in cases of any
announced termination to determine whether the termination
was made in good faith.
The majority of the court affirmed the Commission's order
as to the first 11 paragraphs, but overruled paragraphs "12" and
"13" on the grounds that the termination provisions of Coors and
its distributors were a matter of private contract. Since the Com-
mission found that Coors used the threat of speedy termination
of the contract to force its distributors into anticompetitive be-
havior, and since the court held that there was substantial evi-
dence in the record to support the Commission's finding, it would
seem that the Commission's wide remedial discretion"s should
have supported its entire order. As the dissenting opinion states:
The Commission has wide discretion in its choice of a remedy
deemed adequate to cope with unlawful practices in this area of
trade and commerce. See Siegel v. Federal Trade Commission, 327
U.S. 608, 611, 66 S. Ct. 758, 90 L. Ed. 88. The Courts interfere only
where there is no reasonable relation between the remedy and the
violation. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 381
U.S. 357, 377, 85 S. Ct. 1498, 14 L.Ed. 2d 443. And orders affecting
contractual relationships have been upheld where unlawful prac-
tices involved subtle pressures and threats of termination of dealer's
licenses. Id. at 374-375. On this record and the findings I would
uphold as reasonable the Commission's choice of a remedy to cope
with the unlawful practices."
The difficulties encountered by Coors in its attempt to
enforce a lawful price-maintenance program without being found
guilty of price fixing illustrate once again the continued erosion
of the Colgate doctrine. 7 They also point up the necessity for
" See FTC v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 387 U.S. 244 (1967); Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357, rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965); FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v.
FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
16 497 F.2d at 1190, citing Atlantic Refining Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 374-75 (1965).
Cf. Arthur Murray Studio v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972). But see Regents v. Carroll,
338 U.S. 586, 600-02 (1950).
'1 United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). An early antitrust case,
Colgate originally stood for the broad principle that in the absence of an intent to create
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manufacturers unable to avail themselves of the fair trade excep-
tions 8 contained in the Sherman Act and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act to avoid any attempt to fix prices or impose territorial
restrictions upon the resale of its products. Coors is another ex-
ample of the necessity for continuous internal monitoring of anti-
competitive activities. It would be surprising, given the strength
of the Commission's evidence of price fixing and territorial re-
strictions, if Coors were the case that persuades the Supreme
Court to overrule or limit its decisions in United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co.,'5 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission,20 and Texaco v. Federal Trade Commission.2'
or maintain a monopoly, a manufacturer may publicize expected resale prices for its goods
and then refuse to deal with wholesalers and retailers which do not conform. Distinguished
and criticized repeatedly since 1919, Colgate was cited somewhat differently in Schwinn,
where it was said to support only the rule that "a manufacturer of product other and
equivalent brands of which are readily available in the market may select his customers,
and for this purpose he may 'franchise' certain dealers to whom, alone, he will sell his
goods." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 376 (1967). For a detailed
history of the Colgate doctrine, see United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29
(1960).
Is 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a)(2) (1970).
" 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
381 U.S. 587 (1965).
21 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
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